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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
BRIGHAM CITY,
PlaintiftfPetitioner,

_

vs.

Case No. 20021004-SC

CHARLES W. STUART, SHAYNE R.
TAYLOR, AND SANDRA A. TAYLOR,
Defendant/Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

ARGUMENT
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the City submits this brief
in reply to respondents' brief.1
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS

Defendants correctly note that the City has not objected to the trial court's findings or
otherwise challenged the court of appeals refusal to remand the case for additional findings
of fact. Resp. Brf. at 11. The City has not challenged those findings because, contrary to
defendants' claim, no additional findings are necessary to conclude that exigent
circumstances existed justifying a warrantless entry.
This Court has explained that the trial court'sfindings"should be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on

1

brief.

The City's reply is limited to answering new matters raised in defendant's opening

each factual issue was reached." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
Although the findings might have been more extensive, they were sufficient to disclose the
steps by which the trial court erroneously concluded that exigent circumstances did not
justify the officers' entry into the home.
After concluding that the officers' lawfully entered the backyard, the trial court found
that "the officers observed, through windows and a screen door, an altercation taking place,
wherein it appeared that four adults were trying to control a juvenile"

R. 80-81: ^j 4

(emphasis added). The trial court also found that there was "a loud, tumultuous thing going
on" so loud that "the occupants probably would not have heard' a knock at the door. R. 81:
f 5 (emphasis added). The trial court further found that "fajt one point, the juvenile got a
hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the nose" R. 81: f 4
(emphasis added). The trial court then concluded that "[a]t that point in time" there were
"no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the officer's entry into the residence" R. 81: If
5 (emphasis added). The trial court's findings, therefore, sufficiently identify the basic facts
upon which it relied in reaching its erroneous conclusion.
Moreover, the trial court's findings provide a sufficient basis for determining that
exigent circumstances justified the officers' warrantless entry. See Pet. Brf. at 7-14.
Defendants contend that exigent circumstances could not exist absent some finding by the
trial court referring to a "Tight/ 'combat,' 'combatants,' 'danger,' 'injury,' . . . 'threat,'
'risk,' 'serious,' 'harm,' or anything similar to describe the situation." Resp. Brf. at 11.
Defendants have cited no cases requiring the use of such talismanic terms, nor are there any.

2

In any event, the trial court made findings consistent with those preferred by
defendants. The court found that "there was a loud, tumultuous thing going on," that "the
officers observed . . . an altercation taking place," and that it appeared to them "that four
adults were trying to control a juvenile." R. 80-81: ff 4-5. The court also found that the
juvenile "smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the nose." R. 81: f 4. These
findings are consistent with the terms preferred by defendant. Defendants also complain that
the trial court did not find that an emergency existed. Resp. Brf. at 11. However, whether or
not there was an "emergency," which is synonymous with "exigency,"2 is a legal conclusion
and the subject of the City's challenge on appeal and on certiorari. See Brigham City v.
Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, f 6, 57 P.3d 1111.
Finally, this Court is not limited to a review of the factual findings in determining
whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that no exigent circumstances existed
justifying the officers' warrantless entry. It may rely on all of the evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing. Only one witness testified for the State—Officer Jeff Johnson. See R.
99. Defendant did not call any witnesses to rebut Officer Johnson's testimony and counsel's
cross-examination of Officer Johnson revealed no significant inconsistencies, if any at all.
See R. 99. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to resolve any conflicts or
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses—the very reason findings of fact are

2

See Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/thesaurus?book=Thesaurus&va=exigency (indicating that synonyms of "exigency"
include "contingency, crisis, crossroad(s), emergency, pass, pinch, strait, turning point, zero
hour").
3

generally necessary. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, (Utah 1991) (holding that
disposition of the suppression motion "required that the court preliminarily resolve a number
of conflicts in the testimony of the [officers] and between the testimony of [defendant] and
[an officer] before it could have a factual foundation for considering whether a constitutional
seizure occurred and, if so, whether it was lawful"). This Court may therefore reasonably
assume that the trial court relied on all of the undisputed testimony as a basis for its decision.
See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n.10 (Utah App. 1990) (relying on unrebutted
testimony of officer although trial court made no findings).3
B.

APPLICATION OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION UNDER
WELSH

Citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984), zndState v. Beavers,
859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), which adopts Welsh, defendants contend that the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to minor violations of the
law. Resp. Brf. at 12. They then claim that the suppression order should be affirmed
because %cby anyone's standard, the violations with which these defendants were charged are
minor violations." Resp. Brf. at 12-13. Defendants do not, however, examine the holding in
Welsh and they do not explain how the Welsh holding applies to the facts of this case. As

3

For example, Officer Johnson's testimony was uncontroverted that: (1) the punch
caused the victim to bleedfromthe mouth or nose, R. 99: 22, 42, 44, 54; (2) other than the
victim, none of those involved in the altercation ceased until after Officer Johnson intervened
by announcing his presence and the participants became aware of his presence, R. 99:23,44;
(3) Officer Johnson asked the victim if he needed assistance, which was refused, R. 99: 56,
59; and (4) a flurry of activity ensued to restrain the juvenile after the punch as Officer
Johnson attempted to attract the participants' attention, R. 99: 23, 42-45, 51-52.
4

noted by this Court, the rules of appellate procedure require "not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority."
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (citing Utah R. App. P. 24(a)). Where
defendants have failed to provide "meaningful analysis," this Court should decline to address
their argument. State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31, 973 P.2d 404. In any event, Welsh is
distinguishable from the facts of this case.
In Welsh, a witness observed a car veering from side to side before swerving off the
road and coming to a stop in an open field. 466 U.S. at 742, 104 S.Ct. at 2093. The driver
asked the witness for a ride home, but the witness suggested that he wait for assistance. Id.
at 742,104 S.Ct. at 2094. The driver instead left the scene on foot. Id. When police arrived
a few minutes later, the witness informed an officer that the driver was either "very
inebriated or very sick." Id. Upon checking the vehicle registration, the officer learned that
the registered owner lived within walking distance of the accident. Id. Police proceeded to
the driver's home where they entered without a warrant and arrested him for driving while
intoxicated (DWI). Id. at 743, 104 S.Ct. at 2094. Defendant was later charged with "a
noncriminal violation [of DWI] subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine
of $200." Id. at 746, 104 S.Ct. at 2095. f
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin identified three exigencies, which in its view
justified the warrantless entry: (1) the hot pursuit by the officers; (2) the driver's threat to
public safety; and (3) the rapidly dissipating blood-alcohol evidence. State v. Welsh, 108
Wisc.2d 319, 336-38, 321 N.W.2d 245, 254-55 (Wise. 1982). On certiorari, the United

5

States Supreme Court rejected all three rationales. Id. at 753-754, 104 S.Ct. at 2099-2100.
The Supreme Court held that "the claim of hot pursuit [was] unconvincing because there was
no immediate or continuous pursuit of the [driver] from the scene of a crime." Id. at 753,
104 S.Ct. at 2099. It held that the threat to public safety had largely abated "because the
[driver] had already arrived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident."
Id. And finally, the Court held that because the first DWI offense was classified as a
"noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment [was] possible/'
Wisconsin's interest in preserving the evidence was insufficient to justify a warrantless
entry. Id. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 2100.
This case is readily distinguishable. First, although the officers were not in "hot
pursuit" of the juvenile, they intervened immediately after the juvenile committed an assault
in their presence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (Supp. 2000). Second, unlike the case
in Welsh, the threat to the safety of others had not abated when the officers entered the house.
Indeed, by any rational account, the violence escalated when the juvenile freed a hand and
landed a punch on one of the adults—the point in time the trial court concluded exigent
circumstances did not exist. See R. 80-81:fflf4-5. Third, the officers' decision to enter the
house was to quell the ongoing violence as much as it was to arrest the juvenile, if not more
so. See R. 99: 51-52, 57, 60.
Finally, the assault which precipitated the warrantless entry cannot be classified as a
"minor" offense as that term was understood by the Court in Welsh. The Supreme Court
stated that "the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest

6

and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of
committing that offense." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 n.14, 104 S.Ct. at 2100 n.14. The
Wisconsin legislature classified afirst-timeDWI as a nonjailable offense subject only to a
$200 civil forfeiture. Id. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 2100. In contrast, an assault in Utah is
punishable by a jail term of up to six months, and if the assault causes substantial bodily
injury, by a jail term of up to one year. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (1999); Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-102 (Supp. 2000).
Moreover, and as noted by Judge Bench in his dissent, it was reasonable for the
officers to assume that the altercation may have been domestic violence because it occurred
in a home and involved both adults and a juvenile. See Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, at ^ 20
(Bench, J., dissenting). The State's strong interest in preventing domestic violence is
reflected in the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (CAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-36-1 to 10 (1999), which imposes added obligations on officers who confront domestic violence.
The court of appeals has observed that CAPA "stands for the proposition that because
domestic violence is serious in nature and has a high likelihood of repeated violence,
incidents of domestic abuse require the mandatory and immediate action of law
enforcement." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah App. 1996) (interpreting the Act's
predecessor). Under CAPA, "[t]he primary duty of law enforcement officers responding to a
domestic violence call is to protect the victim and enforce the law." Utah Code Ann. § 7736-2.2 (1999). CAPA requires officers "who respond[ ] to an allegation of domestic
violence [to] use all reasonable means to protect the victim and prevent further violence,

7

including . . . taking the action that, in the officer's discretion, is reasonably necessary to
provide for the safety of the victim and any family or household member[,] . . . [and]
arranging], facilitating], or providing] for the victim and any child to obtain medical
treatment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1(1) (1999). Failure of the officers to immediately
act as they did would have been a dereliction of their statutory duty.10
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Welsh recognized that preventing ongoing violence
is an exigency that justifies a warrantless intrusion. In concluding that minor offenses should
rarely justify a warrantless entry, the Court favorably quoted the following remarks from
Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in another case:
"Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a
warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to
be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach
i t . . . . It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a
tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious
police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or
threats of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law
with some indulgence to officers acting to deal with threats or crimes of
violence which endanger life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime....
While the enterprise of parting fools from their money by the 'numbers'
lottery ought to be suppressed, I do not think its suppression is more important
to society than the security of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures. When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to

l0

The legislature has also adopted the Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
30-6-1 to -14 (1999), "[i]n response to a growing concern, nationwide as well as in Utah,
surrounding the recognition of domestic violence as a clear community problem." Bailey v.
Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, U 11 n.4,18 P.3d 1129, affd, 2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158. That Act
provides a quick and simplified procedure whereby victims of domestic violence can obtain
protective orders.
8

be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious
consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant/'
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 2098 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451,459-60,69 S.Ct. 191,195-96 (1948)) (emphasis added). Thus, while the Court did not
generally approve of warrantless entries based on exigent circumstances where the
precipitating crime is minor, it recognized that exigent circumstances surrounding a crime of
violence may justify a warrantless entry. Such was the case here.
In sum, and as discussed in the State's opening brief, Pet. Brf. at 12-13, the Fourth
Amendment did not require police in this case to wait until the violence had escalated
further, especially where alcohol was involved, R. 99:32-33, threats were being made, R. 99:
54-55, the altercation took place in a kitchen where weapons were readily accessible, R. 99:
45-46, and the juvenile had increased his odds against the adults by disabling one of them
when he punched him in the face, R. 99:42-44, 51. In other words, the officers had no time
to secure a warrant and they would have acted unreasonably had they left the scene to do so.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the City respectfully
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.
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Respectfully submitted December 19, 2003.
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Cssistant Attorney General
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